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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WALTER SCOTT HANSEN and ] 
KRISTI D. HANSEN ) 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, ) 
vs. ] 
CRAIG OBERG and DIANE OBERG, ] 
Defendants and Appellants. ] 
> Case No. 950231-CA 
) Argument Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER, PRESIDING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, the Honorable David L. Mower presiding, entered November 
22, 1994. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) and pursuant to the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated March 31, 
1995, transferring this matter from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether or not defendants' title to the subject property became perfected under 
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the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence prior to plaintiffs' acquiring a deed to the subject 
property. (Record at 166-169, 197). 
2. Whether or not the lower court erred in awarding to plaintiffs attorney's fees 
incurred in this action inasmuch as the same were not provided for by contract or statute. 
(Record at 182-187, 197). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The first issue stated above is a mixed question of law and fact. The actions or inactions 
of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest with regard to acquiescence in the old fence as a boundary 
are questions of fact, the findings for which may be reversed if "clearly erroneous" so that they 
are "against the great weight of evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly 
convinced that a mistake has been made". Carter v. Hanrath. 885 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1994). 
However, in this case the court did not make any findings relating to acquiescence on the part 
of plaintiffs' predecessors. The legal standard for acquiescence is a question of law which may 
be reviewed by this court for correctness, "granting no particular deference." Carter v. 
Hanrath, supra. 
In reviewing the second issue stated above, the award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs, this 
court reviews the lower court's conclusion of law granting the award for correctness (Cobabe 
v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1989)) and, if properly granted, affirms the amount of 
the award unless it finds that the court abused its discretion. Baldwin v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees 
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity 
in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to the property which is in dispute, to enjoin 
defendants from maintaining a fence as a boundary to said disputed property and for damages. 
(Record at 4-5). Defendants counter-claimed to quiet title to the disputed property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, to enjoin plaintiffs from interfering with defendants' use 
of an irrigation ditch which runs through defendants' property and for damages. (Record at 15). 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This matter was tried to the court on August 3-4, 1994. After trial, the court took the 
matter under advisement and issued its findings of fact and decision on September 21, 1994. 
A copy of the court's findings and decision is included in the addendum hereto. Plaintiff's 
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counsel prepared written findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as a judgment and order 
which were entered by the court on November 22, 1994. Copies of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment are also included in the addendum hereto. The court found that 
there was no acquiescence in the old fence as a boundary by plaintiffs and awarded plaintiffs 
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the action. (Record at 197-198). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs reside in Ephraim, Utah and are adjoining neighbors to defendants. 
(Record at 191-192). 
2. Defendants acquired their property in March 1976 from Kenneth M. Sevy and 
Sylvia L. Sevy by warranty deed dated April 29, 1976, and recorded February 23, 1977, in the 
official records of the Sanpete County Recorder. The real property conveyed by said deed is 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West from the Southwest corner 
of Block 30, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey, and running thence 
North 1.00 chain; thence West 1.58 chains; thence North 17 
degrees 15 minutes West 7.40 chains; thence North 64 degrees 30 
minutes West 2.10 chains; thence South 69 degrees West 1.15 
chains; thence South 30 degrees East 1.90 chains; thence North 78 
degrees 30 minutes East 0.92 of a chain; thence South 14 degrees 
East 2.58 chains; thence South 60 degrees East 0.90 of a cain; 
thence South 3.80 chains; thence East 3.50 chains to the point of 
beginning. 
Said property is also identified in the records of the Sanpete County Recorder as parcel 105, Plat 
MAM, Ephraim City Survey. (Record at 191, Exhibit W2W). 
3. Plaintiffs' acquired their property by warranty deed from Jack Lou Peterson and 
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Kris W. Peterson dated August 8, 1990, recorded August 8, 1990, in the official records of the 
Sanpete County Recorder. The real property described in the deed received by plaintiffs is set 
forth below: 
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West and 1.00 chain North from 
the Southwest corner of Block 30, Plat WA" Ephraim City Survey, 
and running thence West 1.58 chains; thence North 17 degrees 15 
minutes West 3.30 chains; thence East 2.62 chains, more or less; 
thence South 3.29 chains to the point of beginning. 
The foregoing parcel is also identified in the official records of the Sanpete County Recorder as 
a part of Parcel 107, Plat WA" Ephraim City Survey. (Hereinafter referred to as parcel 107). 
(Record at 191, Exhibit "14"). 
4. The properties described in paragraphs 2 and 3 above share a common boundary 
on the south of plaintiffs' property and on the west of plaintiffs' property. Cottonwood Creek 
runs in a basically west to northwest direction and meanders on or near the deeded boundaries 
between plaintiffs' and defendants' property on the north and west of defendants' property. A 
diagram showing the respective locations of the deeded lines and Cottonwood Creek was 
introduced as Exhibit "2", a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto. (Record at 193, 
Exhibit f,2,f). 
5. Exhibit "2" also shows the location of the old fence line North and East of 
plaintiffs' deeded lines which was constructed some time prior to 1923. (Trial Transcript at 
363). When it was new, the old fence consisted of cedar posts with net wire and a strand or two 
of barbed wire on top. (Record at 194). 
6. Defendants' predecessors in interest to parcel 105 were as follows: 
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OWNER DATES OF OWNERSHIP 
Maddonna Beck 1958 - 1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963 - 1971 
Rosella P. Sevy 1971 - 1973 
Kenneth M. Sevy 1973 - 1976 
(Record at 193). 
7. Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest to parcel 107 were as follows: 
OWNER DATES OF OWNERSHIP 
Madonna Beck 1954 - 1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963 - 1970 
Robert P. Sevy 1970 - 1980 
Oscar V. Peterson 1980 - 1983 
Jack L. Peterson 1983 - 1990 
(Record at 193). 
8. Parcels 105 and 107 were under common ownership from November 1958 when 
Madonna Beck owned both parcels until March 1970, when F. Hespert Sevy conveyed parcel 
107 to his son Robert P. Sevy. (Record at 193, Trial Transcript at 185, 187). 
9. Parcel 107 was not used for residential purposes by any of plaintiffs' predecessors 
in interest listed in paragraph 7 above. Plaintiffs were with first to use parcel 107 for residential 
purposes. (Record at 194). 
10. When he acquired parcel 107 from his father in March 1970, Robert Sevy 
understood that the existing old fence north and east of Cottonwood Creek was the boundary 
between his parcel and his father's (105). (Trial Transcript at 291). 
11. Robert Sevy sold parcel 107 to Oscar D. Peterson in 1980. (Record at 193). 
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Oscar Peterson did not have any discussions with defendants, the owners of parcel 105 during 
the time that Oscar Peterson owned parcel 107, concerning the boundaries between the parcels. 
(Trial Transcript at 56). Oscar Peterson did not use the property to the South and West of the 
old fence, other than chasing kids off the property, cutting the rope out of the tree and cutting 
limbs off of a tree. (Trial Transcript at 57-58). 
12. Oscar Peterson sold parcel 107 to Jack L. Peterson in April 1983. (Record at 
193, Trial Transcript at 80). Jack L. Peterson is the brother of Oscar Peterson. (Trial 
Transcript at 80). After acquiring parcel 107 in April of 1983, Jack Peterson did not use the 
property for any purpose. (Trial Transcript at 83). Jack Peterson did not have any discussions 
with defendants regarding the boundary between parcels 105 and 107 during the time that he 
owned parcel 107. (Trial Transcript at 87). 
13. Jack Peterson sold parcel 107 to plaintiffs in August 1990. (Record at 193, Trial 
Transcript at 15, Exhibit "14"). 
14. After Hespert Sevy conveyed parcel 107 to his son Robert Sevy in March 1970, 
he continued to own and occupy parcel 105. (Trial Transcript at 301, 316). 
15. F. Hespert Sevy died in 1970. (Trial Transcript at 311). His interest in parcel 
105 became vested in his surviving spouse, Rozella Sevy, by right of survivorship. (Trial 
Transcript at 187, 312). Rozella Sevy conveyed parcel 105 to their son Kenneth Sevy in 1973. 
Rosella Sevy and Kenneth Sevy continued to occupy that portion of parcel 107 up to the old 
fence line for the purposes of grazing livestock and otherwise until Kenneth Sevy conveyed 
parcel 105 to defendants in April 1976. (Trial Transcript at 216). 
7 
16. From the time defendants acquired parcel 105 in April of 1976, they have used 
that portion of parcel 107 up to the old fence line for grazing horses. (Trial Transcript at 221). 
Defendants understood that the old fence was the boundary between his property and what is 
now plaintiffs' property, but which was owned by Robert Sevy in 1976 when defendants 
purchased parcel 105. (Trial Transcript at 222). Defendant Craig Oberg has also regularly 
cleaned Cottonwood Creek. (Trial Transcript at 241). 
17. In March of 1992, defendant Craig Oberg constructed an irrigation pond on his 
property. (See Record at 195). As a result of conversations with plaintiff Walter Scott Hansen, 
defendant Craig Oberg had constructed a new fence. Plaintiffs were concerned about the safety 
of children in and about the irrigation pond. (Record at 195). The new fence was along the 
same line as the old fence in June of 1992. (Trial Transcript at 364). The reason defendant 
Craig Oberg had the new fence constructed was to keep children out of the irrigation pond. He 
believed he was constructing the fence on his property line. (Trial Transcript at 282). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This action was precipitated by defendants' construction of a new fence along a fence line 
which had existed for more than sixty (60) years. Generally, the old fence was located north 
of the boundary line described in the parties deeds. From the time the old fence was 
constructed, sometime prior to 1923, until the property on either side of the fence came into the 
common ownership of Madonna Beck in 1958, the owners of the property on either side of the 
fence occupied up to the fence and there was never a dispute or any action taken which would 
be inconsistent with the recognition of that fence as a boundary between the adjoining parcels. 
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The property on either side of the fence was in common ownership from October 1958 until 
March 1970 when Hespert Sevy conveyed the property on the northern side of the fence (parcel 
107) to Robert Sevy. From March 1970 until plaintiffs' acquisition of title to parcel 107 in 
August of 1990, there was no dispute as to the fence being the boundary between the properties 
nor any action taken which was inconsistent with the recognition of the old fence as a boundary. 
Defendants and their predecessors occupied up to the old fence line from March 1970 until June 
of 1992, when defendants constructed the new fence along the same line as the old fence. 
Defendants, whose property is south and west of the old fence, seek to quiet title to the 
disputed property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The lower court's finding 
on the issue of acquiescence only goes to acquiescence by the parties to this action. It does not 
address acquiescence by plaintiffs' predecessors in the old fence line. In any event, the element 
of acquiescence is a mixed question of law and fact, with the legal standard for acquiescence, 
consisting of indolence or inactivity, being a question of law reviewable by this court for 
correctness. Acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs' predecessors is imputed from the evidence 
of their indolence and inactivity with regard to the old fence. The other elements of the 
doctrine, occupation to a visible line marked by fences by adjoining landowners for a long 
period of time, having been clearly established, the lower court should have entered a decree 
quieting title to the subject property up to the old fence line in defendants under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
The lower court also erred in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs. The only possible 
basis for an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in this case is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
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Section 78-27-56 which provides for an award of attorney's fees if an action or defense is 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith. Plaintiffs did not assert that section in 
seeking an award of attorney's fees nor did the lower court refer to that section or make findings 
consistent with that section in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Because the award of 
attorney's fees to plaintiffs was not made pursuant to statute or contract, defendants respectfully 
request that this court reverse that portion of the judgment and require each of the parties to bear 
their own attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS' TITLE TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
BECAME PERFECTED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE PRIOR TO THE TIME PLAINTIFFS ACQUIRED 
A DEED TO PROPERTY WHICH INCLUDED THE DISPUTED PROPERTY. 
In Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) the Utah Supreme Court overruled 
Halladav v. Cluff. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984) and reestablished the following elements of 
boundary by acquiescence: 
"(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences, or buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary; (3) for a long period of time; (4) by adjoining 
landowners/ (Omitting citations). 
785 P.2d at 417. In holding that there was mutual acquiescence in a fence line as a boundary 
for a long period of time by adjoining landowners in that case the court stated: 
It appears ... to be undisputed that successive landowners until 
1972 or 1985 regarded the fence as the true boundary line from the 
time they were first erected.... [T]his probably was as early as 
1890. There is no indication in the record that any predecessor in 
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interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief that the 
fence line was the boundary. Owners occupied houses, 
constructed buildings, farmed and irrigated, and raised livestock 
only within their respective fenced areas. *** Additionally, there 
is no indication that any landowner notified his neighbor of a 
disagreement over the true boundary. 
785 P.2d at 420-421. 
In the present case, the lower court appears to have based its finding that there was no 
acquiescence by the parties in the old fence as a boundary upon the testimony of plaintiff Walter 
Hansen regarding conversations between himself and defendant Craig Oberg which purportedly 
occurred in May 1991, March 1992 and August 1992. (Record at 195-196). The substance of 
those conversations as found by the court is that defendant Oberg commented to plaintiff Hansen 
that the boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants' property was the Cottonwood Creek which 
runs near the old fence line. Defendant Oberg's recollection of those conversations varies from 
that of plaintiff Hansen's and is more to the effect that the true boundary line between the 
properties was unknown. (Trial Transcript at 272). Defendant Oberg testified that he believed 
that he owned up to the old fence. (Trial Transcript at 206). Defendant Oberg made repairs 
to the old fence line, cleaned the creek of debris, raised livestock which grazed up to the old 
fence and he and his family otherwise occupied the property up to the fence line for recreational 
and other activities. (Trial Transcript at 221,241,253). 
Defendant Oberg's predecessors, Kenneth Sevy and Hespert Sevy, also occupied the 
property up to the old fence line. Consequently, defendants and their predecessors have 
occupied the subject property up to a visible line marked by definite fence posts and wire fencing 
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material for more than twenty years prior to defendant Oberg's conversations with plaintiff 
Hansen. The record also reflects that plaintiffs' predecessors in interest occupied only up to the 
old fence line and did not take any action or make any statements that were inconsistent with the 
old fence line constituting a boundary between the respective properties. In fact Robert Sevy, 
who owned parcel 107 from 1970 to 1980, asked permission of Craig Oberg to put a V on the 
old fence so that his horse could drink from the creek. (Trial Transcript at 305). 
In King v. Fronk. 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963), the court addressed the issue 
of the sufficiency of occupation of property up to a visible line. In that case defendant Fronk 
acquired Lot 4 in 1948 and from 1948 to 1961 respected a line marked by an old wire fence, 
a barn's wall, shrubs and a concrete driveway. Since 1926, no one in the chain of title on either 
side of that line, dividing Lots 3 and 4, ever questioned the old fence or the line as a boundary. 
In 1961 Fronk anticipated constructing an apartment house and for the first time questioned the 
old fence as a boundary line. In holding that boundary by acquiescence had been established 
prior to 1961, the court stated: 
[A] visible, persisting boundary having been shown over a long 
period of time is convincing evidence of an intended or 
acquiesced-in boundary. 
* * * 
The visible boundary of ancient vintage and persistency of 
placement are the important aspects of the doctrine, although they 
may be indecisive in some rather rare circumstances, mentioned 
above, which could destroy the vertebrae of the doctrine's 
backbone, looking to elimination of litigation involving, perhaps, 
unreliability of memory and cobwebbed evidenced, in the laws 
policy of looking toward repose of title at one time or another. 
12 
* * * 
[W]hat we assert is that the doctrine of "boundary by 
acquiescence" looks to the settling of titles under circumstances 
where claimants, ex post facto, having slept on their claimed rights 
for a long time, presently assert those rights for one reason or 
another, including appreciation of values, un-neighborly relations, 
or because of an equity measured by the length of the Chancellor's 
foot, while insisting on ownership of property that an ancient 
boundary does not reflect or designate on the surface of the 
property. (Emphasis added). 
378 P.2d at 895-896. 
King v. Fronk, supra, was followed by the court in Baum v. Defa. 525 P.2d 725 (Utah 
1974). In that case the fence line in question was constructed by Frank Defa when he owned 
property on both sides of the fence. The fence was originally intended as a barrier to control 
livestock. The fence itself was irregular rather than one which runs in a straight line. After 
acknowledging that the period of time during which a fence exists as a barrier as opposed to a 
boundary does not constitute part of the "long period of time" requisite to establish boundary 
by acquiescence, the court stated: 
"On the other hand, if the property on either side of such a fence 
is conveyed to separate parties, so that there comes into being 
separate ownership of the tracks on either side, and the 
circumstances are such that the parties should reasonably be 
assumed to accept the fence as the boundary between their 
properties, then from that time on, the time during which the fence 
continues to exist, should be regarded as going towards fulfilling 
the time requirement for the establishment of a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
525 P.2d 727. The court then affirmed the lower court's holding that the subject fence 
constituted a boundary by acquiescence. See also Englert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165 (Utah App. 
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1993) (use of property for gardening, relaxation and recreation was appropriate and sufficient 
for the nature of the land to satisfy the occupation element). Similarly, in the present case, the 
circumstances are such that "the parties should reasonably be assumed to accept the fence as the 
boundary between their properties." Baum v. Defa. supra, at 727. 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that defendants and their predecessors occupied 
up to a visible line marked by an existing fence for a period of in excess of twenty years. 
Whether or not such occupation, and the actions or inactions of the owners of the adjoining 
property, constitute "acquiescence" as that term has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court 
and by this court, is a question of law. This court reviews the lower court's conclusions of law 
for correctness without according any particular deference thereto. Carter v. Hanrath. 885 P.2d 
801 (Utah App. 1994). In Carter v. Hanrath. the plaintiff used the disputed property for 
growing hay, pasturing animals and calving, and his predecessors used the disputed property for 
farming and grazing. The "visible line" in that case was cliffs. In addressing the plaintiffs 
argument that acquiescence requires actual knowledge of the disputed boundary the court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "'[acquiescence' is more nearly 
synonymous with 'indolence,' or 'consent by silence,' — or a knowledge 
that a fence or other monuments appears to be a boundary, — but that no 
one did anything about it." Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 
1199, 1200 (1973). This accords with the dictionary definition of 
acquiescence as w[p]assive compliance or satisfaction ... [c]onduct from 
which assent may be reasonably inferred.... Equivalent to assent inferred 
from silence with knowledge or from encouragement, and presupposes 
knowledge and assent." Black's Law Dictionary 24 (6th ed. 1990). 
*** 
Therefore, landowners may acquiesce to a boundary through 
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idleness or laziness. In other words, a landowner whose property 
has been encroached upon acquiesces to the boundary when he or 
she "either had or should have had knowledge that his [or her] 
property was being claimed by another." (Omitting citations). 
* * * 
Moreover, our holding that acquiescence may be imputed from 
long-term indolence is consistent with the policy upon which 
boundary by acquiescence is based, namely 
"that the peace and good order of society require 
that there be stability ... in the ownership and 
occupation of lands.... [B]oundary lines which 
have been long established and accepted by those 
who should be concerned should be left undisturbed 
in order to leave at rest matters which may have 
resulted in controversy and litigation." 
James H. Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries 
and the Need for an Adverse Possession Remedy, 1986 
B.Y.U.L.Rev. 957, 965 (1986) (quoting Olsen v. Park Daughters 
Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 425, 511 P.2d 145, 147 (1973)). 
885 P.2d at 806. In the present case, the actions of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest shows 
a long-term indolence from which legal acquiescence may be imputed as found by the court in 
Carter v. Hanrath. supra. They took no action inconsistent with a recognition of the old fence 
as a boundary. Robert Sevy, who owned parcel 107 for 10 years, testified that he believed the 
old fence was the boundary of his property. (Trial Transcript at 292). His successors did not 
make use of the disputed property. Defendants' title to the subject property under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence was perfected prior to plaintiffs acquisition of parcel 107. Motzkus 
v. Carroll. 7 Utah 2d 2137, 322 P.2d 391 (1958) (purchaser's knowledge of true boundary at 
time of purchase did not defeat boundary established by acquiescence prior thereto). 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO PLAINTIFF IN THE ABSENCE OF A STATUTE OR 
CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR THE SAME. 
In addition to ordering defendants to remove the fence which defendants had constructed 
in June of 1992, the court awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $3,300.00. The 
court did not state its basis for the award of attorney's fees other than the fact that plaintiffs 
were indebted to Mr. Neeley, plaintiffs' counsel, in that amount and that that amount was a 
reasonable attorney's fee for the work performed by Mr. Neeley. (Record at 197). In Baldwin 
v. Burton. 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), the court stated that "the general rule is that an award 
of attorney's fees is appropriate only if authorized by statute or contract." 850 P.2d at 1198. 
In Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989), the court stated that the "general rule 
requires each party to bear his or her own attorney's fees in the absence of a statute or 
enforceable contractual provision to the contrary/1 780 P.2d at 836. The court also noted that 
"attorney's fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as 
a matter of legal right/ Cabrera v. Cottrell, 690 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1985). "Since the right is contractual, the court does not 
possess the same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that 
it has when fashioning equitable remedies, or applying a statute 
which allows the discretionary award of such fees." Spinks v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1975). 
780 P.2d at 836. Consequently, a determination of whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees in this case is a question of law which is reviewed by this court on 
appeal for correctness. However, M[t]he amount of fees to be awarded is 'largely within the 
sound discretion of the trial court'". Cobabe v. Crawford, supra, at 836, (quoting Trayner v. 
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Gushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984)). 
In Hatanaka v. Struhs. 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1987), the lower court found that the 
defendants trespassed upon the plaintiffs property and ordered the defendants to remove a fence, 
dirt, and debris which they had placed on what the court determined to be the plaintiffs property 
and further enjoined the defendants from placing any additional fences, debris or fill on that 
property. The plaintiff also sought attorney's fees which were denied by the lower court. The 
basis for the plaintiffs claim to an award of attorney's fees was Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-27-56 which the court quoted as follows: 
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or 
agreement, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith. 
Because the appellate court found that the defense was meritorious, the issue of good faith was 
not reached. In the present case, plaintiffs did not assert entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56. Nor did the lower court find that defendants' defense 
was not meritorious. As a matter of law, attorney's fees are not awardable in a trespass action 
other than under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56. Inasmuch as that section is not 
applicable to the present action, the lower court erred in awarding plaintiffs attorney's fees. 
Therefore, defendants respectfully request that the court reverse the lower court's judgment 
awarding such fees to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' title to the subject property through the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
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became perfected prior to the time plaintiffs acquired their deed to parcel 107 in August 1990. 
By virtue of defendants' title to the disputed property, defendants construction of a fence along 
the old fence line in June 1992 did not constitute a trespass. The lower court's judgment should 
be reversed so as to quiet title to the disputed property up to the old fence line in defendants. 
Regardless of whether or not the judgment as to boundary by acquiescence is modified 
on appeal, plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to statute or 
contract. The court's judgment awarding plaintiffs their attorney's fees should be reversed and 
the order modified so each of the parties bears their own attorney's fees in this action. 
Dated this / § _ day of August, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Iteynoras 
^Christiansen 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two complete, true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellants by first class mail with postage prepaid thereon, this 18th day of August, 1995 to 
the following: 
Douglas Neeley 
96 South Main 5-15 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
 n 
SANPETE COUNTY B * ^UXldk&h^ 
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-2135 
F
"-EB 
S
^ E T f CUHTY. UTAH 
C
K
^ « F . C M R , S T M W E W 
OEPUTY 
WALTER SCOTT HANSEN and 
KRISTID. HANSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CRAIG OBERG and DIANE OBERG, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION 
Case number 920600278 
Assigned Judge David L. Mower 
The above matter was tried to the Court at Manti on August 3 and 4, 1994. The plaintiffs 
were present with their lawyer, Douglas L. Neeley. The defendants were present with their 
lawyer, Randy J. Cliristiansen. Witnesses testified and evidence was received. There is sufficient 
evidence to support the following facts. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. All the parties to this action are individuals who reside in Sanpete County, Utah. 
2. During the period 1990 until 1992 the parties had minor children residing with 
them in their homes. 
3. Plaintiffs own a parcel of real property in Sanpete County, Utah described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West and 1.00 chain North from the Southwest 
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corner of Block 30, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey, and running thence 
West 1.58 chains; thence 
North 17° 15' West 3.30 chains; thence 
East 2.62 chains, more or less; thence 
South 3.29 chains to the point of beginning. 
This parcel is also identified in the official records of Sanpete County as a portion 
of parcel 107, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey. This parcel has the street address of 
150 North 200 West, Ephraim, Utah. 
4. The defendants own a parcel of real property in Sanpete County, Utah described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point 1.00 chain West from the Southwest corner of Block 30, Plat 
"A" Ephraim City Survey, and running thence 
North 1.00 chain; thence 
West 1.58 chains; thence 
North 17° 15' West 7.40 chains; thence 
North 64° 30' West 2.10 chains; thence 
South 69° West 1.15 chains; thence 
South 30° East 1.90 chains; thence 
North 78° 30' East 0.92 of a chain; thence 
South 14° East 2.58 chains; thence 
South 60° East 0.90 of a chain; thence 
South 3.80 chains; thence 
East 3.50 chains to the point of beginning. 
This parcel is also identified in the official records of Sanpete County as parcel 
105, Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey. 
5. The above described parcels are contiguous to each other and share a common 
9408301.SA 
Hansen vs. Oberg, 920600278 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND DECISION - Page 3 
boundary. The first call of plaintiffs' legal description (West 1.58 chains) is 
common to the second call of the defendants' legal description. The second call of 
the plaintiffs1 legal description is, in part, common to the third call of the 
defendants' legal description. 
6. Stephen L. Ludlow is an individual who resides in Juab County, Utah. He is a 
registered land surveyor of the State of Utah. 
7. In June of 1992 Mr. Ludlow and others under his direction prepared a survey of 
plaintiffs' property. Exhibit number 26 received at the trial is a map that Mr. 
Ludlow prepared. 
8. There is a natural water course running through Ephraim City known as 
Cottonwood Creek. 
9. Cottonwood Creek crosses the two common boundary lines between the parties1 
property so that a portion of it runs through the area enclosed within plaintiffs' 
\ega\ description and a portion runs through the area enclosed within defendants' 
legal description. 
10. The course of Cottonwood Creek is not the same as and does not match the calls 
of the parties' legal descriptions. Nevertheless, knowing the course of the creek 
and its relationship to the parties' property is helpful to the analysis of the facts in 
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this case. 
11. Cottonwood Creek runs in a basically West to Northwest direction. The center of 
the creek, flowing West, enters the property at a point which is approximately 
equal to the point of beginning of plaintiffs' legal description. It then meanders in a 
West by Northwest direction so that at a point approximately 0.75 of a chain West 
of the plaintiffs' point of beginning the entire creek bed is within the property 
enclosed by the plaintiffs' legal description. It continues to meander but changes 
direction so that its course is then North by Northwest and at a point 
approximately 2.50 chains Northwest along plaintiffs' second call the creek channel 
is then completely within the property described in defendants' legal description. A 
graphical representation of these words is found in defendants' exhibit number 2. 
12. The plaintiffs' predecessors in interest were as follows:1 
OWNER 1980-1983 
Madonna P. Beck Jack L. Peterson 
F. Hespert Sevy 
Robert P. Sevy 
Oscar D. Peterson 
DATES OF OWNERSHIP 
1954-1963 
1963-1970 
1970-1980 
No evidence was offered concerning pre-1954 owners. 
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1983-1990 
13. The defendants' predecessors in interest were as follows: 
Maddonna Beck 1958-1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963-1971 
Rosella P. Sevy 1971-1973 
Kenneth M. Sevy 1973-1976 
14. Madonna P. Beck and Maddonna Beck are the same person. 
15. There was testimony from Oscar D. Peterson that he used parcel 107 for raising 
livestock. 
16. There was testimony from other witnesses that Maddonna Beck and F. Hespert 
Sevy, during their separate periods of ownership, used both parcels 105 and 107, 
together, to graze and raise livestock. 
17. At some time in the past, on a date that is unknown to the Court, a fence was 
constructed that ran basically parallel to Cottonwood Creek and which was located 
on parcel 107 and on the North side of Cottonwood Creek (where it runs East and 
West) and also on the East side of Cottonwood Creek (where it runs North and 
South). 
a. When new, the fence was cedar posts with net wire and a strand or 
two or barbed wire on top. 
b. In 1977 the fence was in disrepair. Robert Sevy's brother, Wayne 
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Sevy, built a hog pen on parcel 107 that year and kept hogs in it. 
The fence would have been between the pen and the creek. Wayne 
watered the hogs daily by carrying water in a bucket from the creek 
to the pen. He had no memory of a fence, 
c. In 1990 the fence was in disrepair. 
18. Of all the owners listed herein, the plaintiffs were the first to use their legal 
description for residential purposes. 
19. Madonna P. Beck and the Obergs used parcel 105 for residential purposes. 
20. During the period 1990 to 1992 the parties' minor cliildren occupied those portions 
of parcel 107 and 105 in the area of Cottonwood Creek and used that area for the 
operation of ATVs and for play activities. 
21. In May of 1991 Mr. Hansen and Mr. Oberg had a conversation. Mr. Oberg said, 
in essence, that the boundary between parcels 105 and 107 was the same as the 
course of Cottonwood Creek. 
22. In March of 1992 the defendants begin construction of an irrigation pond on parcel 
105. 
23. In March of 1992 Mr. Oberg and Mr. Hansen met at the site of the irrigation pond 
development site, during which a conversation ensued in which safety of children 
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was discussed. Mr. Oberg said, in essence, that the boundary between parcels 105 
and 107 was equal to the course of Cottonwood Creek. 
24. In June of 1992 the defendant caused a fence to be built. 
a. As far as this case is concerned, that fence follows this line: 
beginning at a point 1.0 chains West and 1.17 chains North from 
the Southwest corner of Block 30 Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey 
and running thence Northwesterly to a point 0.73 of a chain North 
and 0.20 of a chain West from the Southwest corner of parcel 107; 
running thence Northwesterly to the Northeast corner of the 
Hansen's property description. 
b. Please note that I have attempted to generate this legal description 
by looking at the exhibits that were received in evidence in this 
case, especially Mr. Ludlow's map. I have not attempted to 
generate a legal description which matches the exact location of the 
fence as built on the ground. My point has been to show that a 
portion of the fence constructed by the defendants on June 12, 
1992 lies entirely within the Hansens' legal description. 
c. The fence was constructed at the direction of Mr. Oberg. 
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However, he did not do any of the actual work. Rather, he directed 
his employees to do so. The job foreman was Earl Livingston. 
d. Mr. Livingston testified that he received instructions from Mr. 
Oberg as to the location of the fence to be constructed. He was 
instructed to follow the old fence line. 
e. Mr. Livingston and his crew begin constructing the fence on 200 
West in Ephraim at a point on the street about 10 to 15 feet North 
of Cottonwood Creek. The distance from the first post on the new 
fence to the first post on the old broken-down fence was about 20 
feet. The new fence then followed the course of the old fence. 
Each of the old fence posts was cut off with a chainsaw about six 
inches above ground level. 
25. On June 12, 1992 Mr. Scott Hansen was out of town. However, his father, 
Thomas Hansen, appeared at the property when defendants' agents were starting 
construction of the fence and asked them to stop. 
26. In August of 1992 Mr. Hansen and Mr. Oberg had a conversation. Mr. Oberg 
said, in essence, that the boundary between parcels 105 and 107 is Cottonwood 
Creek and that he, Mr. Oberg, would move the fence in the future as Hansens 
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developed their piopertv 
27. Oi i Is fov en lbei •. • . • - . . . ' JouglasL \e t^ \ - a^ \> - ' - c n writing, to 
vacate the Hansens1 pronertv. dismantle the leiuv n 
interference. 
28. 1 
29. The Hansens have emploveJ iK on*** n^dns a.aiiaUw to them to prevent the 
Obergs from trespassing 1 .u'.I.IMUN i* *his !awsu:t 
30. The Hansens are • . - n k till: lat 
he has done. 
31. A . «i niiiilik' .ill. if iu"> I1. 'Ins type of action would chai ge $3300.00 foi the work 
that lias been pei forn led. 
DECISION 
To the extrr? MI,;; there may have been a fence or any other boundary between parcels 105 
.iescence in it by the parties to this action. In other words, there has 
never been a boundary between these parcels that qualifies as a boundary b\ - • this ' 
action. The defendants have trespassed on the property of the plaintiiTs and should be 01 dei ed to 
cease and desist from the trespass and to remove the 'fence which they constructed. 
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Plaintiffs should be awai ded ji ldgment aiyaiiist «1 r11*11«f«1111s u 1 lliey si i 1.) '.r - hfnt\l "' . 
pay to plaintiffs $3,300.00. Plaintiffs should also be awarded their costs, if a proper memorandum 
is si ibn litted 
Mr. Neeley is directed to pi epai e a Judgment ai id Oi der that conforms to this decision and 
to submit it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504,, Code of Judicial 
/ • *- n. 
Signed on September ' } . 1094. 
David I Mower. Judge 
C F . R T I H C A l h O l 
On September->/ '~> 1994 a copy of the above FINDINGS OF FACi An J 
DECISION was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
A d d r e s s e e MeLllod (Mail, inPmon.Fm) A d d r e s s e e Mfithod (Mail, in Prrs<m, P") 
Mr. Douglas Neeley f'O Mr. Randy J. Christiansen W 
Attorney at Law Attorney at Law 
96 S. Main #5-15 64 North 100 East Street 
Ephraim, UT 84627 P.O. Box 896 
Provo, UT 84603-0896 
rr L kd/,s* y ^ CfucjaJ^-A^A— 
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Telephone: 801)283-5055 
xrn .nm 
WALTER SCOTT HANSEN and : ;ND1NGS OF FACT AND 
KRISTI P HANSEN : CONCT ^TONS - *• ;AW 
Plaint ii * , : 
vs . " • . • : C i v i ] No "3 20 600 2 7 3 
CRA, ; OBERG a -d DIANE OBERG : JUDGE DAVID I , MOWER 
Defendant. : 
The abovr-^t • *" ' • : ^ if«*»r \a^! * H j henrir : • * * 
4 t i l nl.i"! • - - . t\ ' t * * ' 
presiding *> I i a i nt it if appeared ir- person ind were represented 
by their attorne * . \l \ I « I lee] ey Tl le Defendai it :=; wei : € present 
and were represented, by the. i i: < i, ttori ley, Randy J Christiansen,. The 
matter was heard on, P] ai i itiffs1" Complaint ai id, upon the Answer and 
Countered a i in • |::: !l 1 • » Defei ,j :::,!=:11 rl ° . 
The Court saving heard the sworn, testimony of the witnesses, 
havi nu examined the documentary nrnof ann havi'ia recei ved evidence 
,uii) . • i '/ 'idv ir '"*« i 
follow I ng: 
v
^A/D r t i p 
By ^ (- /P , 
' ^ 
' ^ ^ 
I1 i il iANPK' l b ( 'HUN I1/ 
S T A T 1 - J ! i : ! - \ ; 
F T N n i N f 7 i I"' II- Al I* 
1 he parties i .- ; a i s a n t i o n ..ire i n d i v i d u a l s who r e s i d e 
i n S a n p e t e - ,_. int.v . \ \
 t:\ 
2 ' IHHI 
c h i l d r e n rxj**. ii: \ * : * * . u-:it • lu i :* .oii.*?s. 
3 , P l a ~* : " f - :»*• ' ^ i o i i e d i proper 4*-/ i , —. ,^>te 
Coi ii \t) 
Beginning <%i a poir ' • l ai . West s: ; ; 
North from the Southwest corner of Block 30 *J 
"A" Ephraim city Survey, and running thence west 
l.^* chainr Uienoe Nort -» . -u- c } . u) chains; 
thence East 2.62 chains, more i^s-; thence ^eutr 
3.29 chains to tho i.^ni- of h 
This parcel , -i. sw , .HH. ilied i i,» oliic.a records rf Sanpete 
County as -i ; -rt inn ..i pnrcp ; •* ^ :H^riim '^••v Survey. 
Th.i:.; par >-: I . i . :_ .phraim, 
Utah. 
Tl le Defendants owi i .i pan ft I ! i i "ii I pi o p e t 1 y i n " »"iii| IC I <"> 
( ..' . M ; U t a i I described as follows: 
Beginning at . _ : J 00 chai i :i l Jest from the 
Southwest corner of Block 30, Plat "A" Ephraim City 
Survey, and running thence North 1,00 chain; thence 
West 1 , 58 chains; thence North 17 ° 159 West 7 . 40 
chains; thence North 64° 30' West 2.10 chains; 
thence South 69° West 1.15 chains; thence South 30° 
East 1.90 chains; thence North 78° 30' East 0.92 of 
a chain; thence South 14° East 2.58 chains; thence 
South 60° East 0.90 of a chain; thence South 3.80 
chains; thence East 3.50 chains to the point of 
beginning. 
This parcel is a] so i denti f ied i n the of f i ci al records of Saiipet- •> 
v as parcel 1 05 , E ] a I ' '" Ephrai in Ci ty Survey. 
5 The above described i i*^;- *r( ,-* ^ J O U K 
and si lar e a c ommoi 1 boi u idc . ..*. . * . ,t *, i Plaint i, : ^ 
descripti.f * , /JL ,:huii- is common *o *::*•- second i:a. - * - •-
Defendant:^ : • : . * > • 
legal :escript , ,.i ^ pa* i , x ».mnk.ii ( :;LI i •- i * 
Defendant/ p descrintion„ 
County, Utah. He : s i i egistered land ..jrvc/or * * he to*" 
Utah •' f'M.) vi-iF :•.-* : r i <->d ts K; ^ xr^rt Wiuie>-
i , ners "«^-- ^ i.ie^u ;n 
prepared a survey laintiffs' property x n i n t number ~u 
received dt . 
8. rrht i i *.t ,«i ti wciiet 'Jourst * ' . * i rou«T \!phra! m 
City - . wr dr- • f>- 1 ;^ • reek. 
• . , . -.es 
between the ^irtK-s' propei t v . t ». n if rtiC ' i: through 
the area e"-*' ^ <»d within Plaintiffs' legal desrripfi mil ,111 1 
^p area enclosed within Defendants 1 «••< |, 1 1 
description 
f
" rse ui Cottii'w-'Od Cree* 
hp r^iic: ^ & p a r ^ .Ma i descriptions. 
Nevertheless, \nowu-.i *•< 1 • : 1'he cr^ek -i J ''*-> r^lr i-r^r* . 
this case. 
1 1 . Cottonwool I Creek i : \ n n :i i ; 1 :esa ca ] ] ;; r Wes t: t: : JNIir : i : t : l lwes I: 
d i r e c t , ] on . The c e n t e r of t l le c r e e k , f ] owi i lg West , e n t e r s t h e 
p r o p e r t y at t p n i n t which i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y equa l t.n t h e po in t of 
be<| i urn in nq i ill In I a i nt i I I ' . ' I! i'ga I Icnn r i |>t. 11 iiiiii I I I lien merind«jr :l. i ill a 
Wesi by Northwest , d i r e c t i o n so I.hat a t a p o i n t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 0 ,75 
of a c h a i n West <»f U I P P l a i n t i f f s ' p o i n t of h e g i n n i n q t hp p n t i r e 
Cfet?k in'ii i", MM inn 1 in |nci[ici 1 \ HNLIMSPII Ir, i me I ' l j i int it I : .. 
d e s c r i p t i o n It c o n t i n u e s i c meander but c h a n g e s d i r e c t i o n so t h a t 
i t ' s c o u r s e i«? thou NnrMi ' >y Nort hwe*-- t , and at' i | n i 
a p p r o x i m a t e d ,i -l > o c h a i n s JNoi Lhwest. a lunq P l a i n t i f f s * second c a l l , 
t h e c r e e k c h a n n e l i s t h e n c o m p l e t e l y w i t h i n t h e p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d 
i n I »P( (aidant «. " Icqa l ilrsi i i pi i in " i)i ai| ill i < ill i c p t o s e i i f 11 I I I I I I ::)f 
these words is found I n Defendants' exhibit number 2. 
12. The Plaintiffs' predecessor's i n i nter est were as follows: 
Owner Dates of Ownership 
Madonna P. Beck ' 1954-] 963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963-1970 
Robert P. Sevy 1970-1980 
Oscar D. Peterson 1980-1983 
Jack I Peterson 1981-1990 
No evidei ice was offered concerning pre-1*-)54 owners. 
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 m The Defendants1 predecessors in interest were as In I hiw4-
Owner Dates of Ownership 
Maddonna Beck 1958-1963 
F. Hespert Sevy 1963-1971 
Rosella P. Sevy 1971-1973 
Kenneth M. Sevy 1973-1976 
1 1 M.ir11 i i in i I , I ' d I .nil I  M u i d u m i a I K n n M i c ' u i i i i c p e r s o n . 
1~.. T h e r e war; * - t :t I P ^ M • om O s c a r L>. Jb-e terson t h a t IIH ispd 
p a r -- • . 
1 6 . The re .v - t e s r i n u r * f or- o t h e r w i t n e s s e s t h a t laddonna 
Bee} :• d ' l e s p e r t Sev * *-: <i 
r a i s e : . v e s t 
t h e C o u r t , -n.n.e wtr > u i : , s ) U u i e a t h a t . m i i s i c a i : v ^ a r a l l e J 
Cottonwood i - ^ ek and whi cl I wa • )rat '^d *- 'o1. * ^  * W 
I'lor! li s i d e n ! i 'u l t nnwond * : -. ,, . W^sjt 
a l s o uri t h e h a s t s i d e ot ri?tt.jnwootl Creek -. * ° ' ^ n s N r t " .t__j. 
S o u t h ) . 
I "lui'hen new, the fence was cedar posts with net wire and 
a, strand or I.wo of barbed wii^ •"; 5 ^ u 
11 l i i ll"i I IIIiic l a i u p i i i t . R o b e r t S e v y ' s 
b r o t h e r , Wayne Sevy, b u i l t a t^>a pe r p a r c e l 107 t h a t y e a r and 
1 i * > 1 1 1 11 (»< | I I I M • I II 11 Il I i n w u 11 h I t i a V c i I»< • • I • 1 1 I; • • I ! < • < t i • Ill I 1 1 1 \ 1 |! • i III i I Ill III I ,„ \ | 1 1 1 m 
'1'ieek. wayne w a t e r e d i lit1 hogs d a i l y by c a r r y i n g w a t e r i n a b u c k e t 
from t h e creeh * : ?,*• • _ •-. - » iu nemory of a f e n c e . 
SI kipd I ! '• 
•wiiei :* n s t t i U n e r e u , t h e P l a i n t i f f s were t h e 
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20. During the period 1990 to 1992, the parties' minor 
children occupied those portions of parcel 107 and 105 in the area 
of Cottonwood Creek and used that area for the operation of ATVs 
and for play activities. 
21. In May of 1991 Mr. Hansen and Mr. Oberg had a 
conversation. Mr. Oberg said, in essence, that the boundary 
between parcels 105 and 107 was the same as the course of 
Cottonwood Creek. 
22. In March of 1992, the Defendants begin construction of an 
irrigation pond on parcel 105. 
23. In March of 1992, Mr. Oberg and Mr. Hansen met at the 
site of the irrigation pond development site, during which a 
conversation ensued in which safety of children was discussed. Mr. 
Oberg said, in essence, that the boundary between parcels 105 and 
107 was equal to the course of Cottonwood Creek. 
24. In June of 1992 the Defendant caused a fence to be built, 
a. As far as this case is concerned, that fence follows 
this line: 
Beginning at a point 1.0 chains West and 1.17 
chains North from the Southwest corner of Block 30 
Plat "A" Ephraim City Survey and running thence 
Northwesterly to a point 0.73 of a chain North and 
0.20 of a chain West from the Southwest corner of 
parcel 107; running thence Northwesterly to the 
Northeast corner of the Hansen's property 
description. 
b. The fence described above, constructed by the 
Defendants on June 12, 1992, lies entirely within the Hansen's 
legal description• 
c. The fence was constructed at the direction of Mr. 
Oberg. However, he did not do any of the actual work. Rather, he 
directed his employees to do so. The job foreman was Earl 
Livingston. 
d. Mr. Livingston testified that he received 
instructions from Mr. Oberg as to the location of the fence to be 
constructed. He was instructed to follow the old fence line. 
e. Mr. Livingston and his crew begin constructing the 
fence on 200 West in Ephraim at a point on the street about 10 to 
15 feet North of Cottonwood Creek. The distance from the first 
post on the new fence to the first post on the old broken-down 
fence was about 20 feet. The new fence then followed the course of 
the old fence. Each of the old fence posts was cut off with a 
chain saw about six inches above ground level. 
25. On June 12, 1992, Mr. Scott Hansen was out of town. 
However, his father, Thomas Hansen, appeared at the property when 
Defendants' agents were starting construction of the fence and 
asked them to stop. 
26. In August of 1992 Mr. Hansen and Mr. Oberg had a 
conversation. Mr. Oberg said, in essence, that the boundary 
between parcels 105 and 107 is Cottonwood Creek and that he, Mr. 
Oberg, would move the fence in the future as Hansen's developed 
their property. 
27. On November 27, 1992, Mr. Douglas L. Neeley asked Mr. 
Oberg, in writing, to vacate the Hansen's property, dismantle the 
fence and desist from any further interference. 
28. The fence still stood on August 3, 1994. 
29. There has never been a boundary between parcels 105 and 
107 that qualified as a boundary by acquiescence. 
30. To the extent that there may have been a fence or any 
other boundary between parcels 105 and 107, there was no 
acquiescence in it by the parties to this action. 
31. The Hansen's have employed the only means available to 
them to prevent the Oberg's from trespassing. That means is this 
lawsuit. 
32. The Hansen's are indebted to Mr. Neeley in the sum of 
$3,300.00 for the work that he has done. 
33. A reasonable attorney in this type of action would charge 
$3,300.00 for the work that has been performed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Decree Quieting Title in and 
to the property more particularly described in paragraph #3 above. 
2. Defendants have trespassed upon the property of the 
Plaintiffs and have constructed a fence that trespasses upon the 
property. The Plaintiffs are entitled to an order that the 
Defendants cease and desist from trespassing upon the property of 
the Plaintiffs and that the fence be removed. 
3. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the 
Defendants for the sum of $3,300.00 plus interest at the statutory 
rate from September 21, 1994. 
4. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs. 
DATED this -J/ day of October, 1994. *-**>* 
{.^iiilu-
JUDGE^DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
96 South Main 5-15 
Ephraim, UT 84627 
Telephone: (801)283-5055 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER SCOTT HANSEN and : JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
KRISTI D. HANSEN : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No, 920600278 
CRAIG OBERG and DIANA OBERG : JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
Defendants : 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 3rd and 
4th day of August, 1994, before the Honorable Judge David L. Mower 
presiding. The Plaintiffs appeared in person and were represented 
by their attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. The Defendants were present 
and represented by their attorney, Randy J. Christiansen. The 
matter was heard upon Plaintiffs' Complaint and upon the Answer and 
Counterclaim of the Defendants. 
The Court, having heard the sworn testimony of the witnesses, 
having examined the documentary proof and received evidence and 
having made and entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and being fully advised in the premises, does now ORDER and 
grants JUDGMENT as follows: 
Qi. 
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1. The Defendants are hereby ordered to cease and desist from 
trespassing upon Plaintiffs' property. 
2. The Defendants are hereby ordered to remove the fence 
which they have constructed upon the Plaintiffs' property. 
3. The Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against the Defendants 
in the sum of $3,300.00, together with interest at the statutory 
rate, from September 21, 1994. 
4. The Plaintiffs are awarded their costs, if a proper 
memorandum is filed pursuant to( Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, said amount being ' l05~. 0° -T^H /3-/fr-f|( 
DATED this -J ( day of Gofcober, 1994. 5;iop,/u. 
Q^c/JUjUr— 
JUDGB^DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
IN THE SIXHT DISTRICT
 C0URT OF SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• • * * * * * * * * * • * * • * • 
WALTER SCOTT HANSEN AND 
KRISTI D HANSEN 
- VS -
CRAIG AND DIANA OBERG 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO, 920600278 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Sanpete) SS. 
I, the undersigned Clerk of the SIXHT DISTRICT Court of the County of 
Sanpete, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of 
the Judgment rendered in the above entitled action, 
and recorded in Judgment Record No. 9 of said court, at page "p" , 
and I further certify that the foregoing papers hereto annexed constitute the 
Judgment Roll in said action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal of said Court hereto set on this , ^ ^ d a y of li/OO. , 
19 <7*f . 
KRISTINE F. CHRISTIANSEN 
Sanpete County Clerk 
//^U^M 
Deputy Clerk 
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